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Innovation Types and Regulation: the Regulatory
Framing of Nanotechnology as “Incremental” or
“Radical” Innovation
Stijn SMISMANS* and Elen STOKES**
Abstract
The regulatory literature has long been concerned with the challenges of technological
innovation, yet it says relatively little about what we understand as “innovative” and
how innovation “types” impact on regulation. This article unpacks the concept of
“innovation” and analyses its signiﬁcance for the development of regulatory strategy. It
shows that innovation types – such as “incremental” and “radical” innovation – are not
clear-cut, but involve differences of interpretation. This interpretive ﬂexibility makes them
powerful discursive resources in regulatory decision-making. Through a study of the EU’s
regulation of nanotechnology, the article shows how arguments of “incremental” and
“radical” innovation can be mobilised to very different effect. These different ways of
conceptualising new technology affect decisions on: (i) the desirability of legislative reform;
(ii) the evidence-base for regulation; and (iii) the use of the precautionary principle. The
study also shows how the framing of technology as “incrementally” innovative can contribute
to a strategy of “deliberate regulatory ignorance”. The article concludes by arguing that
the incremental/radical distinction can be put to more positive use, so that regulatory
choices take account of the different techno-scientiﬁc and socio-economic dimensions of
innovation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between innovation and regulation has attracted signiﬁcant policy and
academic attention in recent years. This is in part because of increased political attention
on the role of techno-scientiﬁc progress in achieving social and economic betterment, but
also because of public controversies concerning the regulation of particular high-tech
products and processes. Typically, the focus is on how regulation might respond to the
risks involved in scientiﬁc and technological innovation by controlling potential harms
to human health or the environment. While the types of risks and reasons for intervening
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** Elen Stokes is Professor of Energy and Environmental Law at Birmingham Law School. We are grateful to
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may vary, there is a general consensus that risk has become “the central organising
principle in regulation and public service delivery”.1 Although this is not unique to the
regulation of new technology, it may indeed be exacerbated by a perceived need to
minimise or eliminate risks created by technological advances.
This article looks beyond the risk regulation literature to the broader literature on
innovation, in order to bring constructive new insights to a critique of EU regulatory
policy. In regulatory scholarship, “innovation” is often used as an umbrella term for a
range of phenomena with which regulation must contend, but relatively little is said
about what we understand as technologically “innovative” or whether we can distinguish
between different types and degrees of innovation for the purpose of regulation. Even
less attention is paid to “innovation” as a discursive practice by which regulation is
framed and legitimated. This article shows how different innovation “types” can be
important strategic resources, in the sense that they actively shape regulatory responses
to new technology.
The article is structured as follows. Section II surveys the different innovation “types” in
the innovation literature and explains the basic conceptual distinction between “radical” and
“incremental” innovation. This literature shows that innovation types are not clear-cut, but
involve differences of both degree and interpretation. Section III investigates, from a
theoretical perspective, the regulatory consequences of dealing with radical or incremental
innovation. Although the distinction has its roots in product management and organisational
theory, it nevertheless has purchase in decisions about regulation. We show that the
distinction between “radical” and “incremental” innovation may impact on: (i) the
desirability of a new legislative framework; (ii) the nature and extent of the evidence-base
for regulation; and (iii) the use of the precautionary principle (PP).
Having dealt with the distinction from a theoretical perspective, we then analyse how
the “radical versus incremental” dichotomy has played out in EU regulatory practice,
using a case study of the EU’s regulation of nanotechnology. Section IV examines
whether the literature on nanotechnology deﬁnes this new technology as “radically” or
“incrementally” innovative. We show not only how conceptualisations of nanotechnology
as “radical” or “incremental” innovation have inﬂuenced the EU’s regulatory approach,
but also how the distinction is open to various interpretive possibilities and, as such,
becomes part of the discursive politics of justifying different regulatory strategies. We
demonstrate this discursive and strategic dimension by contrasting the regulatory responses
of the European Commission and the European Parliament (Sections V and VI). Whereas
the Commission has tended to treat nanotechnology as “incrementally” innovative and as
not requiring speciﬁc regulatory provision, the Parliament has focused on the “radical”
nature of the technology and the corresponding need for regulatory reform.
Exploring this further, we argue that the Commission’s conceptualisation of
nanotechnology as “incremental” innovation has enabled a strategy of wilful non-
knowing or “deliberate regulatory ignorance”. Here, we mean ignorance not only in the
1 J Black, “The Emergence of Risk-Based Regulation and the New Public Risk Management in the UK” (2005)
Public Law 512, 512. Classic sociological works on the role of risk in modern society, for example as a systematic
means of dealing with hazards induced by modernisation, include U Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity
(Sage 1992); Peter L Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk (JohnWiley & Sons 1996); A Giddens,
“Risk and Responsibility” (1999) 62(1) Modern Law Review 1.
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9
sense of knowledge deﬁcits but also as an active construct. Through its narrow framing
of nanotechnology of possible regulatory responses, the Commission has been able to
avoid systematic engagement with broader questions such as the socio-economic
implications of this particular technological development.
The case study shows how policymakers effectively frame innovation as
“incremental” or “radical” as a means of steering regulatory responses in particular
directions. We note, in this context, that the framing of a technology as “incrementally”
innovative may be driven by political convenience, as it relieves policymakers of the
need to seek further understanding of the wider social, economic and environmental
implications of nanotechnology. In other words, the categorisation of innovation into
certain “types” can be a powerful legitimating tool in justifying a particular course of
regulatory action or inaction. By acknowledging that the incremental/radical distinction
is not inevitable but depends, at least in part, on different institutional readings of a
technology’s “innovativeness”, it is possible to see innovation “types” not just as objects
of governance, but as instruments of governance. Moreover, we argue that the
incremental/radical distinction could be put to more positive use by encouraging
reﬂection on the different dimensions of innovation (techno-scientiﬁc and socio-
economic), and by ensuring that the range of issues and complexities is openly and
systematically taken into account.
II. INNOVATION “TYPES”
Much has been written about the role of regulation in responding to innovation.2 These
works deal with different examples of innovation in different ﬁelds (e.g. biotechnology,
ﬁnancial markets) and together they draw a range of conclusions about how law and
governance are or should be deployed in the solving of innovation-related problems. One
of the big questions is whether regulatory responses are sufﬁcient to deal with such
rapidly evolving ﬁelds, however there has been little systematic investigation of how
regulatory approaches may differ depending on the nature of the innovation. Notable
exceptions include the work of Jasanoff on differences in the legal treatment of new
technology depending on whether the technology is construed as “novel”, “natural” or
“normal”,3 and that of Ford on the idiosyncrasies and challenges of regulating “seismic”
and “sedimentary” innovation in the ﬁnancial sector.4 Building on this important
and valuable research, we suggest that there is further work to be done to understand
how innovation “types” contribute to the discursive politics of regulation in the EU.
We pursue this line of inquiry, ﬁrst by identifying different degrees of “innovativeness”,
2 See e.g. RB Stewart, “Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework” (1981) 69(5)
California Law Review 1256; S Jasanoff, Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States
(Princeton University Press 2005); J Black, M Lodge, M Thatcher (eds) Regulatory Innovation: A Comparative
Analysis (Edward Elgar 2006); GN Mandel, “Regulating Emerging Technologies” (2009) 1 Law, Innovation and
Technology 75; R Brownsword and M Goodwin, Law and the Technologies of the Twenty-First Century: Text and
Materials (Cambridge University Press 2012); C Ford, “Innovation-Framing Regulation” (2013) Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 649.
3 S Jasanoff, “Ordering Life: Law and the Normalization of Biotechnology” (2001) XVII(62) Politeia 34; “Ordering
Knowledge, Ordering Society” in S Jasanoff (ed.) States of Knowledge: the Co-Production of Science and Social Order
(Routledge 2004) ch 2.
4 C Ford, Innovation and the State: Finance, Regulation, and Justice (Cambridge University Press 2017)
(forthcoming).
366 European Journal of Risk Regulation Vol. 8:2
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
ir
m
in
gh
am
, o
n 
09
 Ju
l 2
01
9 
at
 0
9:
52
:4
6,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
 h
tt
ps
:/
/d
oi
.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/e
rr
.2
01
7.
9
and then by focusing on how the distinction between “radical” and “incremental”
innovation can inﬂuence regulation. Whereas previous work has analysed the discursive
force of regulation in “normalising” radical innovation,5 we approach the issue the
other way round, by examining the discursive force of innovation (and its various
conceptualisations, e.g. incremental and radical) in shaping and sustaining particular
regulatory responses.
Innovation studies have produced a rich body of theoretical and empirical research
into the meaning of “innovation” in different contexts – such as business organisation
and management,6 marketing,7 and product development.8 We do not detail that work
here, but we will reﬂect on some of its general ﬁndings. A ﬁrst point relates to how
innovation is deﬁned and by whom. Innovation implies novelty, but novelty can be
determined from a range of different perspectives. A product or process may be new to
the world, the industry, the scientiﬁc community, the marketplace, the ﬁrm, or the
customer.9 Likewise, “novelty” may be present in any one of a number of different
things – it may involve new products, service offerings or processes, new beneﬁts, new
patterns of consumption, new supply chains, new risks, or new functionalities, or all of
these elements.10 It may take the form either of pioneering technological developments
or new conﬁgurations of existing technologies.11 The scale at which innovation is
assessed is also important, as it dictates whether innovation is understood in narrowly
technical terms,12 or whether it encompasses a broader range of variables – including
organisational, commercial and social innovations.13 Abernathy and Clark, for example,
have drawn a distinction between innovation at the level of systems and procedures
(called “architectural” innovation), which results in new systems of production and the
creation of new linkages to markets and users,14 and innovation of a more precise kind
(called “niche creation”), which involves reﬁning products or processes to meet
previously unmet consumer needs.15
A second observation is that “innovation” is a question of degree – and, even if there is
little consensus on the appropriate terminology, it is commonly accepted that innovation
works in shades of grey rather than black and white. Innovation is not simply a matter
5 Jasanoff, supra note 3.
6 E.g. MM Crossan and M Apaydin, “AMulti-Dimensional Framework of Organizational Innovation: A Systematic
Review of the Literature” (2010) 47(6) Journal of Management Studies 1154.
7 E.g. J Hauser, JG Tellis and A Grifﬁn, “Research on Innovation: A Review and Agenda for Marketing Science”
(2006) 25(6) Marketing Science 687.
8 E.g. P Trott, Innovation Management and New Product Development (4th edn, Prentice Hall 2008).
9 R Garcia and R Calantone, “A Critical Look at Technological Innovation Typology and Innovativeness
Terminology: A Literature Review” (2002) 19 Journal of Product Innovation Management 110.
10 OECD and Eurostat, Oslo Manuel: Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting Innovation Data (OCED 2005).
11 GM Schmidt, “Low-End and High-End Encroachments for New Products” (2004) 8(2) International Journal of
Innovation Management 167.
12 RR Nelson and N Rosenberg, “Technical Innovation and National Systems” in RR Neldon (ed.) National
Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis (Oxford University Press 1993) ch 1.
13 JA Schumpeter, Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process
(Martino Publishing 1939); S Isaksen and J Tidd, Meeting the Innovation Challenge: Leadership for Transformation
and Growth (Wiley 2006).
14 WJ Abernathy and KB Clark, “Innovation: Mapping the Winds of Creative Destruction” (1985) 14 Research
Policy 3, 7.
15 ibid 10.
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9
of “innovative or not”, for some would argue that any change – to products, processes
or services – involves innovation on some level. So the critical issue becomes “how
innovative?” (not “whether innovative?”), which requires a framework for thinking about
innovation along a sliding scale. Porter famously distinguished between “continuous” and
“discontinuous” technological evolution in analysing product-market competition.16
Abernathy and Clark discussed the contrasts between “regular” and “revolutionary”
innovation in established systems of production and marketing.17 “Regular” innovation
involves change that builds cumulatively on established technical and production
competences and is applied to existing markets and consumers. “Revolutionary”
innovation, on the other hand, is fundamentally disruptive, involving radical market
change and rendering technical and production facilities or resources obsolete.18 Anderson
and Tushman drew a similar distinction between “revolutionary” and “stochastic”
technological breakthroughs.19 Revolutionary breakthroughs involve “fundamentally
different product forms that command a decisive cost, performance, or quality advantage
over prior product forms”.20 Examples include jet engines (rather than piston engines),
and electronic typewriters (replacing mechanical typewriters). Accounts such as these
suggest that innovation can be deﬁned not just in narrowly technical terms, but also in
terms of its broader societal implications – jet engines having reduced travel time and
increased social mobility, and electronic typewriters bringing about greater speed and
legibility in written communication.
As this sketch shows, the terminology (“disruptive”, “sustaining”, “discontinuous”,
“continuous”, “radical”, “incremental”) is ready to hand but can have quite different
connotations depending on context. Insofar as it is possible to draw general principles
from this wide-ranging literature, it can be said that claims of “innovativeness” depend,
at least in part, on differences of perspective and interpretation. Despite this interpretive
ﬂexibility, ontological distinctions continue to be drawn between “radical” and
“incremental” innovation types (or their many variants) as a means of analysing the
effects of innovation on, for example, ﬁrm performance and market structure. Yet,
“radical” innovation and “incremental” innovation are more than ontological concepts;
they are also important strategic and discursive resources. The remainder of the article
looks at how interpretations of innovation as “radical” or “incremental” can be taken up
in competing frames of policy discourse. As different ways of representing technological
innovation, the labels “radical” and “incremental” can proliferate different policy or
regulatory responses and have different political or strategic uses.
III. REGULATING “RADICAL” OR “INCREMENTAL” INNOVATION
From a regulatory perspective, we focus here on the common ground in the deﬁnitions
provided in the literature, by considering innovation on a continuum between more
16 ME Porter, Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance (First Free Press 1985).
17 Abernathy and Clark, supra note 14, 8–12.
18 ibid.
19 P Anderson and ML Tushman, “Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Designs: A Cyclical Model of
Technological Change” (1990) 35 Administrative Science Quarterly 604.
20 ibid 607.
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“radical” (less “incremental”) innovation and more “incremental” (less “radical”)
innovation. We consider that innovation may be “radical” for two main reasons: either
due to the “technical” scientiﬁc novelty of a product or process or both, or because of its
signiﬁcant wider socio-economic implications. The two do not always go hand in hand.
As has been noted, an “incremental” technical development may still have a major socio-
economic impact, for example, due to its creation of new markets, its promise of a
“revolutionised” economy, or its bringing of new beneﬁts to health and the environment.
The converse is also true, since a “radical” technical development will not automatically
or necessarily have a dramatic impact on society more generally.
It is useful to keep these different dimensions (techno-scientiﬁc; socio-economic) in
mind when considering how the distinction between radical and incremental innovation
may impact on regulatory choices. In this section we argue that the conceptualisation of
innovation as “radical” or “incremental” may inﬂuence the regulatory approach in
three main ways: as it relates to (i) legislative reform; (ii) evidence-based regulation;
and (iii) the PP. Our analysis in this section is theoretical, in the sense that it is
independent of our subsequent case study on nanotechnology, but it is empirically
embedded in the context of EU governance. While we identify some normative
arguments (related to, for instance, democratic accountability and evidence-based
policymaking) about how the “incremental”/“radical” distinction can inspire regulatory
choices, we also stress that policymakers may rely on a more pragmatic and strategic use
of the distinction.
1. “Radical” versus “incremental” innovation and the desirability
of a new legislative framework
The overarching question to which commentators often return, is whether a newly
emerging technology is so novel, so “radically different”, that it has outstripped the
capacity of existing regulation to deal with it. As case studies have shown, it will rarely
(if ever) be the case that a technology is so new that there is no applicable law in the
area.21 It may be questioned, however, whether existing regulations are sufﬁciently well
equipped to cope with the patterns and consequences of any given technological
advance. Therefore, the question “how innovative?” is of central importance to decisions
about regulation because the more “novel” a technology is deemed to be, the more likely
it is to be “disconnected” from the regulatory framework, leaving policymakers
and other stakeholders unable to say exactly how the regulation applies.22 So, where
innovation is understood to be “radical” there may be calls for legislative reform.
Conversely, it may be assumed that innovation labelled as “incremental” can be dealt
under existing rules and regulations.
Indeed, a normative case can be made for dealing with “radical” innovation at the
legislative level. Radical innovation will not always – or even usually – warrant an
entirely new legislative framework or new legislative provisions. But, we would suggest,
21 See eg SCHER, SCENIHR, SCCS (2014) Opinion on Synthetic Biology I: Deﬁnition, adopted by the SCCS at their
plenary on 23 September 2014, the SCENIHR at their plenary on 24 September 2014 and the SCHER by written
procedure on 25 September 2014, 16.
22 Brownsword and Goodwin, supra note 2, 64–68.
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9
there are several reasons for ensuring that such decisions are at least discussed as part of
the legislative process. Existing regulatory measures may be ill-suited to dealing with the
risks, opportunities and other challenges associated with an emerging technology.
Relying on “inherited” legislation – legislation designed before the latest technological
development was envisaged or became available – can have its limitations.23 For
example, the legislation may have gaps in content or be out of step with changing social
norms. What is more, because “radical” innovation may bring about signiﬁcant change
not just in terms of technological production, performance or cost but also as regards
broader social and political effects, and because difﬁcult trade-offs may need to be made
between competing values and interests, it is reasonable to expect that these issues would
be discussed at legislative level – so that the pros and cons of legislative reform, and
indeed of the technology itself, are considered in an open and politically accountable
manner. “Radical” innovation (as compared with “incremental” innovation) is also
associated with higher levels of scientiﬁc uncertainty and public contestation,24 and so,
from a democratic perspective, there are compelling reasons for addressing such issues
through the legislative procedure, rather than just at the executive level during the
implementation of existing rules and regulations.
While there is a normative, democratic case to be made for radical innovation to be
addressed through legislative process, in order to have open debate about difﬁcult trade-
offs, policymakers might make strategic, discursive use of the incremental/radical
distinction with quite the opposite effect. In other words, policymakers might perceive
the socio-economic beneﬁts of a technology as “radically” new, but describe the
technology as “incrementally” innovative in technical terms, thereby avoiding the need
for a new legislative framework that might otherwise stiﬂe innovation. It can also be the
case that risk-based regulation does less well at “seeing” or detecting incremental
innovation, and so undervalues its signiﬁcance.25
2. “Radical” versus “incremental” innovation and
evidence-based policymaking
The distinction between “radical” and “incremental” innovation may also affect the
evidence-base for policy and regulation, particularly the use of different evidence-
gathering tools and procedures. In the case of “incremental” innovation, it may often be
enough to gather evidence via risk assessments at the executive stage of implementing
existing legislation. Risk assessment is applied in areas involving exposures to potential
harm, such as in ﬁelds chemicals or food regulation, where the development of new
products and processes brings beneﬁts but may also threaten the protection of public
health or the environment. Risk assessment typically relies on scientiﬁc expertise
gathered or institutionalised “independently”, at a distance from the political arm of
decision-making. Within the EU governance structure, risk assessment applies
23 E Stokes, “Regulating Nanotechnologies: Sizing Up the Options” (2008) 29(2) Legal Studies 281.
24 GC O’Connor and CM McDermott, “The Human Side of Radical Innovation” (2004) 21 Journal of Engineering
and Technology Management 11.
25 See e.g. J Black and R Baldwin, “When Risk-Based Regulation Aims Low: Approaches and Challenges” (2012)
6(1) Regulation and Governance 2; Ford, supra note 4.
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predominantly in the day-to-day implementation of legislation, in situations where
agencies and expert committees provide the Commission with independent scientiﬁc
advice to decide, for example, whether to authorise a particular product or substance.
Although such risk assessment – conducted at the executive level and predominantly
techno-scientiﬁc in nature – may be sufﬁcient for incremental innovation, radical
innovation can pose bigger challenges to evidence-based policymaking.
Radical innovation is described as inhabiting a “high uncertainty” domain,26 and the
greater the departure from existing technological products/processes (i.e. the more
“radical” it is), the greater the potential unknowns and epistemic challenges. The product
management literature, for example, shows that radically innovative products can be
accompanied by increased uncertainty in four different respects: technical, market,
organisational and resources.27 Increased uncertainty may also be seen in terms of health
and environmental risks and socio-economic impacts. This poses obvious challenges in
terms of evidence-gathering, but, given the EU’s commitment to evidence-based
decision-making, it must at least be arguable that the higher the levels of uncertainty, the
greater the need to broaden the view of what constitutes “acceptable” evidence for
regulatory action. In other words, high uncertainty invites policymakers to go the extra
mile to gather information from a wider range of sources, to identify the main points of
contention and to give a clearer indication of the nature and extent of the unknowns – not
just those relating to technical risk, but also those stemming from the socio-economic
complexity of innovation.
In EU governance, the obvious instrument to provide a wider evidence-base for
policymaking is the integrated impact assessment (IIA).28 Since 2003, the European
Commission has operated a system of IIA aimed at assessing the economic, social and
environmental impacts of all new legislative and major policy measures. Unlike risk
assessments, IIAs are drafted by the European Commission itself, requiring the gathering
of wider-ranging evidence, including that derived from consultation with stakeholders.
This is particularly relevant when contemplating the regulation of technology that is
“radically” innovative not only (or even mainly) in the techno-scientiﬁc sense, but also
(or rather) as regards its socio-economic implications. In theory, at least, IIAs provide
systematic means of assessing, on an equal basis, the likely economic, environmental
and social implications – including but not just in terms of risk – and highlighting the
main potential trade-offs involved in regulation. We recognise that the IIA is not perfect
and raises its own set of questions,29 but under current arrangements it is the only formal
procedure under which these broader trade-offs can be routinely made (e.g. between
risks and wider socio-economic impacts, or between the objectives of risk management
and innovation policy).
26 GC O’Connor and MP Rice, “A Comprehensive Model of Uncertainty Associated with Radical Innovation” (2013)
13 Journal of Product Innovation Management 2, 12.
27 ibid.
28 Although the two cannot be separated entirely, as the results of risk assessments can also feed into the IIA process
(Commission, Better Regulation “Toolbox” (2015) Tool 12).
29 See e.g. J Torritia and R Löfstedt, “The First Five Years of the EU Impact Assessment System: A Risk Economics
Perspective on Gaps Between Rationale and Practice” (2012) 15(2) Journal of Risk Research 169; S Smismans and
R Minto, “Are Integrated Impact Assessments the Way Forward for Mainstreaming in the European Union?” (2016)
Regulation and Governance, advance online publication: doi:10.1111/rego.12119.
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Hence, there is a normative argument for the regulation of radical innovation to rely
not only on risk assessment but also on IIA, particularly if the application of risk
assessment is otherwise limited to the day-to-day implementation of existing regulatory
frameworks. Moreover, given the potentially signiﬁcant consequences of radical
innovation, it is arguably more appropriate to attempt to balance these considerations
using an IIA at the legislative level so that the wider evidence-base can be fully debated.
But while this may be normatively desirable in terms of evidence-based policymaking
and democratic accountability, policymakers may in fact follow exactly the opposite
strategy. By framing a technology as merely “incrementally” innovative, it becomes
possible to narrow the evidence-base of policymaking. Such an approach, which may be
characterised as deliberate non-knowing or “wilful regulatory ignorance”,30 can be used
to avoid the prospect of new legislation and thereby circumvent the need for an IIA.
3. “Radical” versus “incremental” and the precautionary principle
The distinction between “radical” and “incremental” innovation can also determine
whether and how regulatory decisions are based on the PP. This relates to the question of
evidence above. To understand how the deﬁning of innovation as either “radical” or
“incremental” may affect regulatory choices about the PP, we ﬁrst need to take a closer
look at the relationship between the PP and evidence. The PP enjoys pre-eminence in EU
law, as a constitutional principle in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.31 Generally
speaking, the principle requires decision-makers to be attuned to the problems caused by
scientiﬁc uncertainty, and is used to justify regulatory action when supporting evidence
is lacking. Yet its relationship with evidence-based policymaking is not self-explanatory.
Some have even argued that the PP and evidence-based policy sit at opposite ends of
the spectrum, and EU institutions have been accused of implementing the PP in ways
that are “arbitrary and capricious”32 and irrational.33 One of the criticisms is that the PP is
“anti-science” because it encourages decisions based not on scientiﬁc fact but on
unsubstantiated fear.34 But even a cursory inspection of relevant EU documents reveals
that the PP does not provide a blank cheque for regulatory intervention35 and that
evidence of some sort is needed before the principle is invoked.
While there are differing views on how much evidence is “enough” for the PP to
apply, experience has shown that decisions in this context are approached in a highly
rationalistic manner and kept within certain methodological limits.36 Rather than
30 For related discussion in the private sector, see D Michaels, “Manufactured Uncertainty: Contested Science and the
Protection of the Public’s Health and Environment”, in RN Proctor and L Schiebinger (eds) Agnotology: The Making
and Unmaking of Ignorance (Stanford University Press 2008) ch 4.
31 TFEU, Art. 191(2).
32 GE Marchant and KL Mossman, Arbitrary and Capricious: The Precautionary Principle in the European Union
Courts (AEI Press 2004).
33 CE Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge University Press 2005); Government
Ofﬁce for Science, Annual Report of the Chief Scientiﬁc Advisor 2014 – Innovation: Managing Risk, Not Avoiding It
(Government Ofﬁce for Science 2014) 8.
34 Sunstein, ibid.
35 ACM Meuwese, Impact Assessment in EU Lawmaking (Kluwer Law International 2008) 89–91.
36 JF Whitehouse, “Will the Precautionary Principle Affect Environmental Decision-Making and Impact
Assessment?” in R Harding and E Fisher (eds) Perspectives on the Precautionary Principle (Federation Press
1999) ch 3.
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dictating a particular outcome, the PP governs the process by which regulatory decisions
are made.37
At EU level, we can distinguish between “ex ante evidence” and “ex post evidence”
dimensions of the PP. The ex ante dimension relates to the evidence policy makers have to
provide when invoking the PP. First, the Commission notes that the PP “should be
considered within a structured approach to the analysis of risk”.38 Thus, a conditio sine qua
non of the PP is risk assessment. Even if risks cannot be “fully” demonstrated by conclusive
scientiﬁc evidence, the application of the PP requires at least some evidence of the reality
and seriousness of the potential adverse effects. Risk assessment comprises hazard
identiﬁcation, hazard characterisation, appraisal of exposure and risk characterisation, and
“[a]n attempt to complete as far as possible these four components should be performed
before action is taken”.39 Secondly, action taken on the basis of the PP should respond
“proportionately” to the potential risk.40 What is “proportionate” will depend on the
outcome of a cost-beneﬁt analysis, by which the most likely consequences of action and
inaction are compared.41 Importantly, the Commission states that cost-beneﬁt analysis
should be wide in scope and “other analysis methods, such as those concerning … the
socio-economic impact … may also be relevant”.42 The more recent Better Regulation
package of the Commission requires that a “proportionate impact assessment” has to be
adopted whenever the PP is invoked.43 Although there is some legal ambiguity as to
whether a “proportionate impact assessment” equates with a full IIA (i.e. triggering the
corresponding requirements of an assessment of socio-economic and environmental
impacts and particular forms of stakeholder consultation), it is clear that regulatory
measures based on the PP cannot be adopted without any evidence. A series of procedural
steps must be taken, including a risk assessment to make an initial calculation of the
probability and magnitude of harm, and a proportionate impact assessment of the costs and
beneﬁts of the proposed action.
There is also an “ex post evidence” aspect to the PP, requiring additional evidence-
gathering exercises once a regulatory act based on the PP has been adopted. The idea is to
ensure that decision-makers will go on to conduct a more detailed risk assessment than
was possible when the regulation was introduced, and consider the need for regulatory
revisions. According to the Commission, “[d]ecision-makers faced with an unacceptable
risk, scientiﬁc uncertainty and public concerns have a duty to ﬁnd answers”.44 Any risk
management measure adopted on the basis of the PP should go “together with collection
37 E Fisher, Risk Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism (Hart 2010); M Weimer, “Applying Precaution in
EU Authorisation of Genetically Modiﬁed Products – Challenges and Suggestions for Reform” (2010) 16(5) European
Law Journal 624.
38 Commission, “The Precautionary Principle” (Communication) COM (2000) 1 ﬁnal, 2.
39 ibid Annex III.
40 ibid 17–18.
41 Case T-70/99 Alpharma Inc v Council of the European Union [2002] ECR II-3495, para. 323.
42 Commission, supra note 38, para. 6.3.4. It is also important to note criticisms that cost-beneﬁt analysis is a ﬂawed
method of decision-making, owing to problems of reductionism and incommensurability: see e.g. F Ackerman and
L Heinzerling, “Pricing the Priceless: Cost Beneﬁt Analysis of Environmental Protection” (2002) 150 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 1553; cf CR Sunstein, “Incommensurability and Valuation in Law” (1993) 92(4) Michigan
Law Review 779.
43 Commission, Better Regulation “Toolbox” (Commission 2015), Tool 12.
44 Commission, supra note 38, 3.
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of additional evidence and review”45 and should be “subject to review, in the light of
new scientiﬁc data” and “capable of assigning responsibility for producing the scientiﬁc
evidence necessary”.46
The framing of innovation as “incremental” or “radical” can inﬂuence the role of the
PP and its evidence dimensions in different ways. Given that “incremental” innovation is
said to involve iterative change and is derivative of existing products and processes, it is
often viewed as presenting low or “acceptable” risks and/or low uncertainty. As such, it
may easily fall outside the scope of the PP, either because there is sufﬁcient information
available for appropriate preventive measures to be taken or because the desired level of
health or environmental protection is not jeopardised.47 However, this implies a
narrowing of the evidence base for decision-making. In the event that “incremental”
innovation fails to trigger the PP (and hence a proportionate impact assessment), there is
no formal, institutionalised ex ante method of analysing the broader socio-economic
impacts as a matter of routine. Of course, there may be other, ad hoc ways of ensuring
that the broader impacts of incremental innovation are taken into account (through
for example, practices of Responsible Research and Innovation),48 but absent any
expectation or obligation to do so, there is a danger that the wider setting of innovation –
its economic, environmental and social circumstances – will be overlooked.
If a technology is framed as “radical” in nature, it is more likely that the PP will be
invoked, as it is associated with high or “unacceptable” risks and/or high uncertainty. In
the event that the PP is applied, both its ex ante (risk assessment, impact assessment) and
ex post (further data collection and periodic review) stages of evidence-gathering should
come into play. However, even in cases of radical innovation, the evidential narrowness
and lack of empirical ambition of the PPmay still cause difﬁculties. As mentioned above,
at the ex ante stage, the requirement to adopt a “proportionate impact assessment” when
invoking PP is not necessarily the same as a requirement to conduct an IIA. Moreover, at
the ex post stage, decision-makers are required to assign responsibility for producing the
scientiﬁc evidence needed for a more comprehensive risk assessment, but there is no
equivalent duty to continue to gather information on socio-economic considerations
once the PP has been applied.
The overall effect is that broader concerns relating to innovation can receive short shrift
(either because of a failure to trigger ex ante evidence-gathering or because ex post
evidence-gathering operates within narrowly circumscribed limits). Although the framing
of innovation as “incremental” or “radical” will help to determine whether the PP applies,
that distinction could in fact be put to more worthwhile use. Scholars in science and
technology studies and cultural studies have long called on decision-makers and policy
actors to bridge the divide between techno-scientiﬁc and socio-economic risk analyses.49
45 Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines. SE (2009) 92, Annex 12, 75.
46 Commission, supra note 38, 3.
47 ibid 7.
48 Commission, Options for Strengthening Responsible Research and Innovation (Commission 2013) ch 2.
49 B Wynne, “May the Sheep Safely Graze? A Reﬂexive View of the Expert-Lay Knowledge Divide” in S Lash,
B Szerszynski and B Wynne (eds), Risk, Environment and Modernity (Sage 1996) ch 2; A Stirling, “‘Opening Up’ and
‘Closing Down’: Power, Participation, and Pluralism in the Social Appraisal of Technology” (2008) 33(2) Science,
Technology and Human Values 262. In legal scholarship, see M Lee, “Risk and Beyond: EU Regulation of
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9
We contend that a more creative use of “incremental” and “radical” innovation types
would represent an important step in that direction. Decisions on whether the PP will be
invoked, and the evidence related to that, should start from the acknowledgement that a
technical innovation can be radical or incremental for techno-scientiﬁc reasons and/or
socio-economic reasons. A particular innovation may present a low or acceptable level of
risk in techno-scientiﬁc terms (“incremental”) but also wide-ranging and uncertain socio-
economic impacts (“radical”). Similarly, an innovation may pose a high or unacceptable
risk and high uncertainty in techno-scientiﬁc terms (“radical”) but be expected to have
limited socio-economic implications (“incremental”).50 In the spirit if not the letter of
the PP, either variation could prompt ex ante evidence-gathering and ex post efforts to
gather further information on the full gamut of policy-relevant issues, including both
techno-scientiﬁc and socio-economic concerns.
To summarise, the framing of a technology as “incremental” or “radical” may impact
on the regulatory approach in several ways; namely, by inﬂuencing the desirability of
legislative reform, the use of evidence-gathering tools and the application of the PP.
Policymakers may make strategic use of framing innovation in one way or another
to support their preferred regulatory solution. The categorisation of innovation as
“incremental”, for instance, can be used to avoid the high demands of evidence-based
policymaking (or narrow its signiﬁcance) or avoid new legislative action based on the
PP. At the same time, the “incremental” versus “radical” divide, by acknowledging its
dimensions along both the techno-scientiﬁc and socio-economic dimensions, could
provide a more nuanced guide to the application of the PP, the choice of regulatory
intervention and the evidence on which it is based.
We now turn to the example of EU nanotechnology regulation to show how ideas of
“incremental” and “radical” innovation have come to frame not only the policy debate
but also the regulatory responses in terms of legislative reform, evidence-gathering and
the PP. To begin with, we give a brief introduction to nanotechnology and highlight the
divergence of opinion as to its “innovativeness”.
IV. NANOTECHNOLOGY: RADICAL BREAKTHROUGHS OR
INCREMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS?
“Nanotechnology” involves the creation or manipulation of materials at a tiny scale – the
“nanoscale”.51 Nanomaterials have extremely small dimensions in the range 1–100
nanometres, one nanometre being one billionth of a metre.52 Materials are deliberately
engineered at the nanoscale because they can have very different properties from their
everyday equivalents. The capacity to produce materials with new and desirable
properties has the potential to beneﬁt many industrial and commercial sectors, and this
potential is beginning to be realised.
(F'note continued)
Nanotechnology” (2010) 35(6) European Law Journal 799; EU Regulation of GMOs: Law and Decision Making for a
New Technology (Edward Elgar 2008).
50 See F Haines, The Paradox of Regulation: What Regulation Can Achieve and What it Cannot (Edward Elgar 2011),
especially on “actuarial” risk, as distinct from socio-cultural and political risk.
51 RS/RAEng, Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies: Opportunities and Uncertainties (RS and RAEng 2004) 5.
52 BSI, Vocabulary – Nanoparticles, Publicly Available Speciﬁcation 71 (BSI 2011) 3.
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A good deal of attention is paid to the extent to which the products and processes
of nanotechnology differ from those resulting from conventional means. Hotly debated
are the possible applications of nanotechnology, as well as their potential risks and
uncertainties. First, discussions of theoretically possible but currently unfeasible uses of
nanotechnology tend to focus on its revolutionary nature and disruptive potential.53
Here, accounts may even stray into the realm of science ﬁction, such as that of Drexler
who sees a role for nanotechnology in space colonisation: “Low-cost, lightweight,
extremely strong materials would make transportation far more energy efﬁcient and –
ﬁnally – make space transportation economical. The old dreams of expanding the
biosphere beyond our one vulnerable planet suddenly look feasible once more”.54 His
more controversial claims include that “nanorobots… could destroy viruses and cancer
cells, repair damaged structures, remove accumulated wastes from the brain, and bring
the body back to a state of youthful health”.55 By any reckoning, those descriptions seem
far-fetched, but especially when compared with more modest claims that current
applications of nanotechnology “are actually incremental advances in well-developed
areas of science”.56 Others suggest that nanotechnology is seriously over-hyped, since
“neither its ideas nor embodiment are entirely new” and “nanoscale science has been
commonplace in biology and chemistry ... for many decades”.57
As such, there are conﬂicting views about the extent to which the ideas, methods or
applications of nanotechnology are radically or incrementally new, and there is a limit to
how far generalisations can be made about the technology – since “nanotechnology” is
an umbrella term used to capture a huge variety of products and processes across diverse
sectors and over different timeframes (i.e. present, near future, distant future). Such
conﬂict is also apparent in debates about the potential risks associated with
nanotechnologies. Although it is believed that some applications of nanotechnology
“will present risks unlike any that we have encountered before”,58 there is disagreement
about the degree to which those risks are new. Not all nanomaterials will be more
hazardous than substances in their conventional form, but it is conceivable that some
could cause unexpected interactions with the environment59 or human beings.60 After
all, one of the attractions of nanotechnology is that it enables the engineering of
nanomaterials that have new physical or chemical properties, and that exhibit behaviours
quite unlike the same materials in bulk form. Concerns have been raised, therefore, that
the very properties of nanomaterials that make them commercially so attractive could
53 S Wood, R Jones and A Geldart, The Social and Economic Challenges of Nanotechnology (ESRC 2003) ch 4.
54 KE Drexler, “Machine-Phase Nanotechnology” (16 September 2001), available at <http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~rau/
phys600/drexler.htm> (accessed 31 March 2017).
55 ibid.
56 DWHobson, “Commercialization of Nanotechnology” (2009) 1(2)Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Nanomedicine
and Nanobiotechnology 189, 193.
57 D Loveridge, “Nanotechnology: its Potential as the ‘Next Industrial Revolution’ and its Social Consequences”
(2002) Ideas in Progress Paper No 30, 2.
58 AD Maynard, Nanotechnology: A Research Strategy for Addressing Risk (Woodrow Wilson Center 2008) 6.
59 Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Novel Materials in the Environment: The Case of Nanotechnology
(Cm 7468 2008) 14, 57.
60 M Kendall and S Holgate, “Health Impact and Toxicological Effects of Nanomaterials in the Lung” (2012) 17(5)
Respirology 743.
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potentially pose unforeseen risks.61 Whether those properties produce “radically” or
“incrementally” different risk proﬁles rather depends on the context in which such a
determination is made.62
But while one might speculate about the unusual properties and toxicity of certain
nanomaterials, they can in some circumstances be difﬁcult to characterise with precision.
And while initial evidence suggests that certain nanomaterials, in certain exposure
scenarios, may present an increased hazard, it is not always clear what this means in
terms of risk – because of gaps in technical data or a lack of applicable test methods.63
This may be thought of as uncertainty in the “straightforward” sense of incomplete
information, which, it is presumed, can be overcome by closing knowledge gaps and
developing suitable metrics – in other words, by “doing more science”. But uncertainty
also exists in relation to the “non-technical” aspects of nanotechnology, given that there
has been relatively little evidence-gathering on issues such as the public acceptability of
the technology and its various applications. As the science and technology studies
literature has shown, the “facts” about a technology are multi-faceted, and often highly
contested and inconclusive – certainly in the early stages of the technology’s
emergence.64 This presents signiﬁcant challenges for policymakers, especially since
regulation is expected to be based on clear evidence and “sound science”.65
From this we can note that a technology may be regarded as an “incremental”
development in some ways but a “radical” departure in others. For example, its potential
risks may be seen as a mere continuation of those associated with existing technological
products/processes, and yet in terms of uncertainty and contingency it may be deemed to
be socially, economically and/or materially different. This separating out of the risks
from the broader effects is evident in the case of nanotechnology, where emphasis is on
both the evolutionary (“incremental”) nature of potential harms and the revolutionary
(“radical)” promise of far-reaching beneﬁts. Take, for instance, the application of
nanotechnology to the chemical and pharmaceutical industries. While techniques of
nanotechnology in these sectors are described as “another incremental advance in
nanoscale science”, their broader impact on the economy and society “may be
substantial”.66
So there is no easy answer to the question, is nanotechnology “radically” or
“incrementally” innovative? Much depends on the focus, perspective and indeed
imagination of the observer. Given the ﬂuidity and constructedness of the boundaries
between different innovation “types”, one might well conclude that such a division has
little normative force. And yet, we ﬁnd the categorisation at the very heart of the EU’s
regulation of nanotechnology. Even though the EU institutions rarely use the terms
61 AD Maynard, “Safe Handling of Nanotechnology” (2006) 444 Nature 267, 267.
62 MD Maynard, “Is Novelty Overrated?” (2014) 9 Nature Nanotechnology 409.
63 SCENIHR (2007) Opinion on the Appropriateness of the Risk Assessment Methodology in Accordance with the
Technical Guidance Documents for New and Existing Substances for Assessing the Risks of Nanomaterials, adopted at
the 19th plenary on 21–22 June 2007; OCED, Report of the OECD Expert Meeting on the Physical Chemical Properties
of Manufactured Nanomaterials and Test Guidelines (OECD 2014).
64 See e.g. WE Bijker, TP Hughes and T Pinch (eds), The Social Construction of Technological Systems (MIT Press
1987); A Feenberg, Transforming Technology: A Critical Theory Revisited (Oxford University Press 2002).
65 S Jasanoff, “Procedural Choices in Regulatory Science” (1995) 17 Technology in Society 279.
66 Wood, Jones and Geldart, supra note 53, 5.
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“incremental” and “radical”, these ideas carry important political and strategic
implications. Indeed, the question of whether nanotechnology is radical or incremental
in nature, while unsatisfactory in many regards, has had a pivotal role in constructing
regulatory responses. Here we ﬁnd that the European Commission and the European
Parliament have taken very different stances on the “innovativeness” of nanotechnology,
which is in turn reﬂected in their polar opposite positions on the nature and extent of
evidence-based regulation in this context.
V. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND THE REGULATION OF
“INCREMENTAL” INNOVATION
Let us start with the European Commission’s characterisation of nanotechnology as
“incremental” innovation, and examine how this characterisation has resulted in an approach
to regulation based on existing legislation, evidence-gathering at the executive level, a lack
of active engagement with the PP and an avoidance of IIA. The Commission is of the view
that new applications of nanotechnology fall squarely within the remit of existing
regulations, notwithstanding that the regulations were introduced long before applications of
nanotechnology became commercially available and viable.67 Existing regulations are broad
in scope and establish general, technology-neutral standards of health and environmental
safety, and there is no shortage of regulatory coverage in sectors in which nanotechnology is
currently used (such as chemicals, foods, medicines and cosmetics). The General Product
Safety Directive, for instance, requires manufacturers and suppliers to ensure that their
products are safe before being placed on the EU market.68 With limited exceptions, the
Directive covers all products intended for, or likely to be used by, consumers, and it does not
distinguish between products of different technological origin and/or material size. Sector-
speciﬁc legislation imposes similarly generic standards of safety. TheGeneral Food Law, for
example, stipulates that food “shall not be placed on the market if it is unsafe”.69 It applies to
all food products, whether or not they contain nanomaterial ingredients.
It is worth noting that many of these existing legislative measures contain references to
or are based on the PP. The General Food Regulation provides that, where harmful
effects on health have been identiﬁed through scientiﬁc assessment, but scientiﬁc
uncertainty persists, a Member State may adopt provisional risk management measures
based on the PP until further scientiﬁc information becomes available.70 So engagement
with the PP occurs if and when a Member State chooses to adopt a risk management
measure on this basis – although outside these conﬁnes, the PP features little in the
Commission’s discussion of nanotechnology regulation. On the application of chemicals
regulation to nanotechnology, for example, the Commission has noted that the relevant
legislation is already underpinned by the PP.71 In other words, the Commission adopts a
67 Commission, “Regulatory Aspects of Nanomaterials” (Communication) COM (2008) 366 ﬁnal, 3; “Second
Regulatory Review of Nanomaterials” (Communication) COM (2012) 572 ﬁnal, 11.
68 European Parliament and Council Directive 2001/95/EC on general product safety [2002] OJ L11/4, Art. 3.
69 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 laying down the general principles and
requirements of food law [2002] OJ L31/1, Art. 14.
70 ibid Art. 7.
71 Commission, “Regulatory Aspects of Nanomaterials”, supra note 67, 4.
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9
deferential approach, meaning that discussion of the PP is limited to observations that the
principle is already enshrined in EU product legislation. Its usage is thus conﬁned to
the implementation stage of existing legislative measures and individual executive
decisions – either by Member States where market entry is regulated at national level,
or by the Commission assisted by comitology where regulatory decision-making
is centralised.
Given that existing regulations are broad in remit, establish generic standards of safety
and take into account the PP, the Commission has concluded that “current legislation
covers to a large extent risks in relation to nanomaterials and that risks can be dealt with
under the current legislative framework”.72 In other words, the Commission sees no need
for substantive legislative reform. Nanotechnology does not present “radically” different
risks such that it necessitates new legislative provisions. Instead, the Commission
approaches nanotechnology as “incremental” innovation that can be dealt with under
existing regulatory regimes. It is interesting that the scope and content of existing
regulatory measures should inform understandings of technological novelty like this.73
Such framing has important implications for the evidence gathered in the
policymaking process. Because it has not presented any new legislative or major
policy initiatives to deal with nanotechnology – preferring instead to rely on existing
regulations – the Commission has not undertaken any IIAs on the issue (with one
exception).74 This does not mean a complete absence of evidence-gathering in EU
policymaking on nanotechnology. Rather, it means that evidence-gathering has taken
place predominantly in the application of the existing regulatory regimes, by way of
scientiﬁc assessment at the executive level. There are numerous examples of this.
For instance, the Commission’s scientiﬁc committees have published several opinions
on consumer safety, public health and environmental issues associated with
nanotechnologies generally. The former Scientiﬁc Committee on Emerging and Newly
Identiﬁed Health Risks has issued opinions on matters such as the risk assessment of
products of nanotechnologies75 and on the appropriateness of methodologies for testing
the potential risks of nanotechnologies.76 The scientiﬁc committees have also produced a
series of ad hoc risk assessments for speciﬁc applications of nanotechnology.
For example, the former Committee on Consumer Safety has published risk assessments
for the use of nanoscale titanium dioxide77 and carbon black78 in cosmetic products.
72 ibid 3.
73 Jasanoff, supra note 3.
74 Note that the Commission has introduced two new implementing acts that mention “nanoparticles” and substances
in “nanoform” (Commission Regulation (EC) 450/2009 on active and intelligent materials and articles intended to come
into contact with food [2009] OJ L 135/3; Commission Regulation (EU) 10/2011 on plastic materials and articles
intended to come into contact with food [2011] OJ L 12/1); however, neither measure was subject to IIA and both were
designed to facilitate the implementation of the existing regulatory regime. For excellent discussion, see T Ehnert,
Regulating the Invisible: A Critical Analysis of the EU’s Approach to Nanotechnologies (Maastricht University Centre
for European Law 2015). For the exception, see Commission, “Impact Assessment on the Revision of the Regulatory
Framework for Medical Devices” (Staff Working Document) SWD (2012) 273 ﬁnal.
75 SCENIHR, Risk Assessment of Products of Nanomaterials, adopted at its 28th plenary on 19 January 2009.
76 SCENIHR, supra note 63.
77 SCCS, Opinion on Titanium Dioxide (Nano Form), adopted by written procedure on 22 July 2013.
78 SCCS, Opinion on Carbon Black (Nano Form), adopted at 4th plenary meeting of 12 December 2013 (revised on
27 March 2014 and 15 December 2015).
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Other opportunities for evidence-gathering arise under the sector-speciﬁc legislation.
For instance, the Community Action Rolling Plan under EU chemicals legislation
speciﬁes which chemical substances are to be subject to in-depth evaluation. Member
States contribute to the development of the Community Action Rolling Plan by proposing
chemical substances for inclusion. A number of Member States have initiated substance
evaluation activities for various nanomaterials: for example, the Netherlands has proposed
the evaluation of nanomaterial silicon dioxide, due to concerns about the characterisation
and toxicity of nanoparticle-forms of the substance;79 and Germany has singled out
multi-walled carbon nanotubes because of concerns about possible risks posed to
consumers and workers.80 Under that procedure, the Competent Authority in the
respective Member States will evaluate the substance before preparing a draft decision or
conclusion document (depending on the sufﬁciency of available information).
Several points are worth noting. One is that the evidence gathered during these
processes relates to issues of science. Scientiﬁc input is, of course, essential to evaluating
the risks involved in applications of nanotechnology, even if it is not the only source of
policy-relevant knowledge. A cursory survey of the evidence-gathering exercises on
nanotechnology reveals that an overwhelming majority of them are focused on the
technical aspects of regulation nanotechnology, such as how to assess the risks of
nanomaterials already covered by EU regulation. Much less attention has been paid to
the broader types of information that would normally be collected and analysed through
IIA. That is not to say that there is no room for considering broader socio-economic
factors. For instance, provision is made under the REACH Regulation for certain
decisions, in certain circumstances, to take into account the socio-economic implications
of authorising or not authorising a chemical substance81 – however, the limited scope of
the provision means that it is not routinely engaged. As a result, the approach taken to the
socio-economic aspects of nanotechnology may be described as ad hoc rather than
principled. Moreover, by concentrating its efforts on regulatory implementation (rather
than on legislative reform, which would automatically be subject to an IIA), the
Commission bypasses broader questions about the direction of technological progress,
the public acceptability of the risks involved, and the fair distribution of costs and
beneﬁts.
For the purpose of regulation, the Commission’s characterisation of nanotechnology
as “incremental” innovation is based on techno-scientiﬁc claims of risk. When dealing
with research and innovation policy, however, the Commission’s framing of
nanotechnology is rather different. There the Commission underlines the radical
potential of nanotechnology, describing it as a “key enabling technology” in the EU’s
quest to achieve a highly innovative, knowledge-based economy.82 According to its
strategy for the “Innovation Union”, nanotechnology will play a key role in the EU’s
79 ECHA, Nanomaterials and REACH: Eighth Stakeholders’ Day (ECHA 2013).
80 ECHA, Justiﬁcation for the selection of a substance for CoRAP inclusion: Multi-Walled Carbon Nanotubes
(MWCNT), synthetic graphite in tubular shape (ECHA undated).
81 Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the
Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) [2006] OJ L396/1, Art. 60(4).
82 Commission, “Preparing for Our Future: Developing a Common Strategy for Key Enabling Technologies in the
EU” (Communication) COM (2009) 512.
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expanding markets and increased global competitiveness.83 The Commission notes
that nanotechnology has “huge commercial potential” and that “the potential of
nanotechnology to do good, or at least to make a proﬁt, is clearly immense”.84
Nanotechnology is said to hold “the promise of leading to the development of smart nano
and micro devices and systems and to radical breakthroughs in vital ﬁelds such as
healthcare, energy, environment and manufacturing”.85 Moreover, the Commission
describes nanotechnology as having “revolutionary impact” in materials science,
information and communications technology, life sciences and consumer products “once
the research is translated into breakthrough products and production processes”.86
The Commission concludes that “scientists and businessmen are unanimous:
nanotechnology is much more than just a new ‘hype’”.87 This supports a particular
vision of nanotechnology – as offering a great deal of promise – while downplaying
complexity, uncertainty and controversy.88 Yet general claims about the beneﬁts of
nanotechnology are supported by little evidence, and no serious attempts have been
made to hold them to account. Although the IIA is one forum in which the weighing-up,
trading-off and balancing of competing claims could take place, this option has not been
pursued as a matter of course.
Whereas the Commission makes broad claims about the “radical” beneﬁts of
nanotechnology in the context of innovation policy, it approaches the issue of regulation
as involving “incremental” innovation governable by existing legislation and at the
executive level of risk assessment. By deploying arguments of “mere incremental
change”, the Commission employs a strategy of “deliberate regulatory ignorance”89 and
avoids having to establish a broader evidence base or conduct democratically
accountable debate to provide reasons for its regulatory choice. One might wonder
whether the Commission’s approach has been inﬂuenced by previous regulatory
controversies involving technological innovation, such as the cultivation and marketing
of genetically modiﬁed organisms (GMOs). The Commission has been heavily criticised
for its handling of GMO regulation,90 and it is understandable that it would want to avoid
similar reproach by downplaying the need for more extensive scrutiny in the context of
nanotechnology.
83 Commission, “Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative Innovation Union” (Communication) COM (2010) 546 ﬁnal.
84 Commission, Nanotechnology: Innovation for Tomorrow’s World (Commission 2004).
85 Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing Horizon
2020 – The Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014–2020)” (Communication) COM (2011)
809 ﬁnal, para. 1.2.2.
86 Commission, “Second Regulatory Review on Nanomaterials”, supra note 67, 46.
87 Commission, supra note 84, 46.
88 Of course, the same holds for generalisations in the other direction, i.e. warnings of the risks of nanotechnology as if
nanotechnology were a single type of technology. For discussion, see GA Hodge GA, DM Bowman and ADMaynard,
“Introduction: The Regulatory Challenges for Nanotechnologies” in GA Hodge, DM Bowman and AD Maynard (eds)
International Handbook on Regulating Nanotechnologies (Edward Elgar 2010) 7.
89 See alsoWEWagner, “Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on
Health and the Environment” (2004) 53(6) Duke Law Journal 1619; JY Zhang, C Marris and N Rose, The
Transnational Governance of Synthetic Biology: Scientiﬁc Uncertainty, Cross-Borderness and the “Art” of
Governance (Centre for the Study of Bioscience, Biomedicine, Biotechnology and Society, LSE 2011).
90 On the political and legal conﬂicts, see G Skogstad, “Contested Accountability Claims and GMO Regulation in the
European Union” (2011) 49(4) Journal of Common Market Studies 895.
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VI. REGULATING “RADICAL” INNOVATION AND THE RESPONSE OF THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
So far we have shown how, in formulating its regulatory response, the Commission has
characterised nanotechnology as a type of “incremental” innovation that does not require
new legislation, IIA or additional engagement with the PP. By contrast, the European
Parliament has approached nanotechnology as an example of “radical” innovation in
need of legislative reform (and hence an accompanying IIA) based on the PP. So, unlike
the Commission, which has interpreted nanotechnology as adequately covered by
existing legislative frameworks, the Parliament does not accept that existing regulations
are ﬁt for purpose.91
The Parliament’s Environment Committee has been especially critical of the
Commission for providing only a general overview of existing legislation and for
failing to consider the speciﬁc properties, uses, risks and beneﬁts of nanotechnology. For
example, it once remarked that “the Commission’s analysis is based on a one-
dimensional, legalistic overview of the current rules but those rules are about as effective
in addressing nanotechnology as trying to catch plankton with a cod ﬁshing net”.92 It
said it “deplores the absence of a proper evaluation of the de facto application of the
general provisions of Community law in the light of the actual nature of
nanomaterials”,93 and disagreed with the Commission’s view that the full implications
of nanotechnology were appropriately covered.94 In its Resolution on the matter, the
Parliament highlighted that “nanomaterials have the potential to bring about far-ranging
societal change”,95 and “[c]alls on the Commission and Member States to pay special
attention to the social dimension of the development of nanotechnology”.96 It went on
to argue that nanomaterials should be treated as “new” substances under existing
regulation, so that they would be assessed separately from conventional types of
material.97 Moreover, the Parliament has called for “nano-speciﬁc amendments to
relevant horizontal and sectoral legislation”.98
Such an approach is based, at least in part, on the idea that legislative amendment is
justiﬁed on grounds of the PP. For example, the European Parliament has argued that
nanomaterials “should be covered by a multi-faceted, differentiated and adaptive body
of law based on the precautionary principle”,99 citing the Commission’s earlier
Communication on the Precautionary Principle as a reason for introducing new legislative
provision. This stands in contrast with the Commission’s approach to nanotechnology,
which is premised on the idea that the PP is already operative under the EU acquis.
91 European Parliament, “Report on Regulatory Aspects of Nanomaterials” A6-0255/2009, 10.
92 ibid 16.
93 ibid 10.
94 ibid.
95 European Parliament, “Regulatory Aspects of Nanomaterials” (Resolution) P6_TA(2009)0328, para. W.
96 ibid para. 19.
97 ibid para. 11.
98 ibid para. 7.
99 ibid para. Q.
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This illustrates how different ideas about the role and functioning of the PP can rest on
different conceptions of innovation.
One might expect from the foregoing that the European Parliament’s opposite stance
on nanotechnology would also open up the possibility of IIAs, based on engagement
with the PP. Yet the situation is not so straightforward, and it is important to remember
that any discursive framing of innovation types takes place against a complex legal and
political backdrop. Although the Parliament perceives nanotechnology to be at the
“radical” end of the innovation spectrum (having the potential to effect “far-ranging
societal change”100 and requiring at least some consideration of a dedicated legal
framework), its limited institutional powers mean that it cannot draft new legislation on
the matter. Instead, new legislation depends on the initiative of the Commission –which,
as shown above, has not been forthcoming.
To overcome this practical difﬁculty, the Parliament has adopted a strategy of
tabling nano-speciﬁc amendments whenever existing legislation comes up for periodic
review by the Commission.101 During periodic review, the Commission has proposed
various revisions to measures of existing legislation but none of its proposals (with
one exception, discussed below) has made any reference to “nanomaterials” or
“nanotechnology”. The European Parliament, during its ﬁrst or second readings of the
Commission’s proposals, has inserted nano-speciﬁc provisions to the legislative text.
Through this approach, it has succeeded in introducing legislative requirements for
nanotechnology in sectors of food,102 cosmetic products,103 electrical and electronic
equipment,104 and biocidal products.105 For example, authorised biocidal products
containing nanomaterials must now carry a label listing all nanomaterial ingredients,
followed by the word “nano” in brackets.106 Cosmetic products containing
nanomaterials must similarly be labelled, and be notiﬁed to the Commission before
being placed on the market.107 So just as the Commission has used arguments of
“incremental” innovation to justify the legislative status quo, so too has the European
Parliament relied on claims of “radical” innovation to instigate legislative change.
Following this line of thought, it seems reasonable to suppose that the European
Parliament’s approach would also have resulted in more systematic engagement with
the PP through the use of ex ante and/or ex post gathering and analysis of evidence.
Curiously enough, though, the Parliament has failed to carry out any impact assessment – in
spite of its criticisms of the Commission for neglecting the wider implications of
100 European Parliament, supra note 95.
101 RG Lee and E Stokes, “Material Uncertainty: Nanomaterials, Regulation and Symbolic Legislation” in B van
Klink, B van Beers and L Poort (eds) Symbolic Legislation: Theory and Developments in Biolaw (Springer 2016) ch 13.
102 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 on the provision of food information to
consumers [2011] OJ L304/18, Arts. 2(2)(t), 18(3).
103 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 on cosmetic products [2009] OJ L342/59,
Arts. 13(1)(f), 16, 19(1(g).
104 European Parliament and Council Directive (EU) 2011/65 on the restriction of the use of certain hazardous
substances in electrical and electronic equipment [2011] OJ L174/88, Preamble 16.
105 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 on biocidal products [2012] L167/1,
Arts. 3(1)(z), 3(3), 3(4), 4(4), 19(1)(f), 25(c), 58(3)(d), 65(3)(d), 69(2)(b).
106 ibid Art. 69(2)(b).
107 Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009, supra note 103, Art. 13(1)(f).
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9
nanotechnology regulation. It transpires that the way in which the regulatory framework
evolved has important consequences for the evidence on which it is based. Since the
nano-speciﬁc amendments were introduced by the Parliament, none were subject to an
IIA by the Commission. At the same time, however, the European Parliament failed to
live up to its commitment to adopt its own impact assessment on any substantive
amendments that it proposes. Such a commitment was made in the 2003
Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-making108 and the 2005 Interinstitutional
Common Approach to Impact Assessment,109 and is repeated in the new Inter-
institutional Agreement on Better Law-Making proposed in 2015.110 Yet none of the
Parliament’s amendments concerning nanotechnology have been accompanied by an
impact assessment. This suggests one or a combination of things; the Parliament might
not have conceived of its amendments as “substantive”, or it might not have had the time
or resources to devote to an impact assessment.111 Whatever the case may be, it suggests
that arguments of “radical” innovation have justiﬁcatory force – in the same way that
arguments of “incremental” innovation have justiﬁcatory force, albeit in the opposite
direction – but their normative and methodological (i.e. evidence-gathering)
implications need to be more carefully worked through.
The result is that the newly-amended regulatory framework now applicable to
nanotechnology has a thin evidence base. One way of redressing this would be to require a
more explicit treatment of the different dimensions of innovation – techno-scientiﬁc and
socio-economic – and a more liberal reading of the PP, so that scientiﬁc uncertainty and
potentially signiﬁcant effects in either dimension would prompt further evidence-
gathering and evaluation. We have seen above how decision-makers can have a tendency
to deal with one dimension or the other in matters of regulation (the Commission with
the techno-scientiﬁc aspects; and the European Parliament with the socio-economic
concerns). In order to ensure that both receive due attention, and so that future legislative
amendment on nanotechnology is subject to (or more seriously considered for) IIA as a
matter of routine, it is important to ensure that techno-scientiﬁc and socio-economic
considerations are both built into processes for regulating innovation.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have explored the concept of innovation to show the importance
of nuance in thinking about regulatory responses, and to highlight both the strategic
and normative force of particular innovation “types”. By relying on a broader
innovation literature, and taking our cue from studies of biotechnology112 and
108 European Parliament, Council, Commission (2003) Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making [2003]
OJ C321/1, para. 30.
109 European Parliament, Council, Commission, Inter-Institutional Common Approach to Impact Assessment, avai-
lable at <http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/better_regulation/documents/ii_common_approach_to_ia_en.pdf>, para. 14
(accessed 31 March 2017).
110 Commission, “Proposal for an Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Regulation” (Communication) COM
(2015) 216 ﬁnal, para. 10.
111 T Ehnert, Regulating the Invisible: A Critical Analysis of the EU’s Approach to Nanotechnologies (Maastricht
University Centre for European Law 2015); The Legitimacy of New Risk Government – A Critical View in Light of the
EU’s Approach to Nanotechnologies in Food” (2015) 21(1) European Law Journal 44.
112 Jasanoff, supra note 3.
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9
ﬁnancial products regulation,113 we have distinguished between “radical” and
“incremental” innovation and assessed the implications of this distinction for EU
regulatory policy. Acknowledging that the distinction is not clear-cut but a question of
degree, we have argued that whether one is dealing with “radical” or “incremental”
innovation may have an impact on the choice of regulatory framework, the use of the PP,
and the nature and extent of the evidence-base. The case study of nanotechnology
regulation shows how the distinction has played out in practice in this particular ﬁeld.
The EU’s regulatory approach to nanotechnology is characterised by a tension
between the Commission, which approaches the issue as one of “incremental”
innovation, and the European Parliament, which sees nanotechnology in more
“radical” terms. Although the Commission makes broad and often unsubstantiated
claims about the radical socio-economic potential of nanotechnology, its regulatory
approach has focused on nanotechnology as necessitating the risk regulation of
incremental innovation. As a result, evidence-gathering has tended to be conﬁned to
processes of risk assessment conducted in the implementation of existing, generic
legislation. As a consequence, the evidence-base of policy on nanotechnology is thin as
it only provides information on the application of non-speciﬁc legislative frameworks
and through the risk assessments underpinning executive decisions, which do not
involve the routine gathering of broader information as would be expected of IIA. While
the Parliament has managed to insert nano-speciﬁc provisions into existing legislation, it
too has failed to add much to the evidence base of the regulatory framework. As a result,
and notwithstanding claims about the socio-economically, “radically” innovative nature
of nanotechnology, the regulatory approach is characterised by a paucity of evidence
about the social, economic and environmental aspects of nanotechnology and only
limited engagement with the PP. This approach is regrettable for several reasons: it does
not allow for trade-offs between narrowly-deﬁned risks and wider socio-economic
impacts (or a more substantive use of the PP in this regard), nor does it promote open
discussion of the careful balance between risk regulation in a narrow sense and other
policymaking objectives. Moreover, by framing nanotechnology as “incremental”
innovation and conﬁning evidence-gathering to the level of risk assessment at the
implementation stage, the Commission has bypassed a more broadly informed and more
democratic debate on the issue.
While the regulatory literature has generally paid little attention to the strategic uses of
“innovation”, policymakers are actively involved in conceptualising innovation in order
to frame regulatory approaches and justify regulatory choices. The conceptualisation of
innovation can therefore be understood as an important device in the discursive politics
of regulation. In our case study, the approach of the Commission to frame nano-
technology as “incremental” is unlikely to be unintentional. Faced with the uncertainty
of radical innovation, a strategy of “deliberate regulatory ignorance” – enabled by
framing the issue as merely incremental – might prove an attractive means of avoiding
public and political conﬂict that could stiﬂe innovation. It is doubtful that this approach is
unique to nanotechnology. The Commission’s approach in this particular instance is
perfectly understandable, however it is disappointing from a normative perspective.
113 Ford, supra note 4.
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The label “incremental” should not be an excuse to limit exercises in evidence-gathering
and avoid broader debate. On the contrary, it could even be argued that public
policymaking institutions should be more willing to go the extra mile by gathering all
possible information and allow a democratic debate on innovation that has potentially
wide social, economic, health and environmental impacts. Recognising that innovation
can be “radical” or “incremental” along different dimensions (techno-scientiﬁc and
socio-economic) may help to structure the inclusion of more nuanced considerations
about legislative reform, the use of PP, and requirements of evidence-based
policymaking.
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